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THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
Mr. Brian Crozier*
The title of my talk is "The Nature of the Soviet Chal-
lenge". I propose to say a few words, first, about the nature
of the Soviet state, because unless one defines the beast, one
has difficulty in grappling with it. I shall then go on to say
something about the things that the Soviet Union is doing in
the world at the moment, which, in effect, constitute a
challenge. And then I shall have the impertinence to say
something about the way this country is reacting to that
challenge. And after that, discussion will be wide open.
I think the thing that distinguishes the Soviet state above
all is its arbitrary character in legal terms. The KGB, or
Commission on State Security, is the last of a long string of
initials, including familiar ones such as the MVD and MKVD
and many others, tracing back to the cheka of Czarist days.
In effect, the KGB is above the law. And the Soviet Union is,
perhaps, the prototype police state and still possibly the most
pervasive police regime in the world. And by "police regime",
of course, I mean a regime in which the police are universally
prevalent but invisible.
I'm addressing an audience consisting largely of lawyers,
but I myself am not one. I have a piece of paper here. I
notice that Admiral Mott was giving suspicious glances in
my direction, because he doesn't believe in people using notes.
But I can assure him that these are not notes. I'll tell you
what they are. They are quotes and excerpts from a funda-
mental book written years ago by the late Andrei Vyshinsky,
who was at one time the Foreign Minister of the Soviet
Union, called "The Law of the Soviet State," which I re-
viewed in the "Sidney Morning Herald" in 1949. And al-
though many things have changed in the Soviet Union since
1949, these fundamental passages still underlie the Soviet
concept of the law. Each one of them, however, deserves a
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few lines of comment. And we always used to say that
comment is free but must be carefully distinguished from
fact. This isn't always observed by my journalistic profes-
sion, but we feel that it ought to be.
Well, on the right to work, Mr. Vyshinsky said, "The
right to work is the foundation whereon the Soviet citizen's
rights and freedoms rest. Capitalism, on the other hand,
cannot exist without a vast reservoir army of unemployed,
ever lowering the pay for work and service."
Well, of course this is a pious aspiration, but in the
Soviet Union, particularly at the time when Vyshinsky was
writing, the population of the concentration camps, the labor
camps, was variously estimated at between thirteen and
twenty million. So, in effect, this was a disguised unemploy-
ment. Later Mr. Khrushchev, after years of denying that
there was such a thing as a concentration camp in the Soviet
Union, told a visiting party of French Socialists led by
Monsieur Guy Mollet, that the concentration camps had been
closed. So something that didn't exist had been closed. And
since then, there's been a revival. I don't know what the
present population of the labor camps is, but it's certainly
over the million.
So intent were the rulers of the Soviet Union on main-
taining the fiction that there is no unemployment in the
Soviet Union that there were no labor exchanges until a few
years ago, because since there were no unemployed, people
could not possibly be looking for work. Now there are a few.
The right to education: "Only in the USSR have the
toiling masses gained free access to education, including
higher education."
Well, of course, unless you educate people, you cannot
efficiently exploit them. In the first ten or fifteen years of
the Soviet Union the economic trend was mainly backward,
in the sense that it was only about 1927 that that vast
country caught up with, for example, the cattle population of
Czarist times, and, indeed, industrial production, in general.
But the one thing that really did make progress, and made
progress very fast, was education. The fight against illit-
eracy made giant strides. In about ten years, or fifteen years,
the percentage of illiterates fell from something like eighty
percent to something like nine percent. And this is an
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achievement that must be recognized, but the underlying
purpose of it should not be forgotten.
Freedom of conscience: "Encroachment of any sort upon
the freedom of conscience of citizens is subject to prosecution
by law."
On the other hand, if one tries to preach against the
religion of communism, against its god, Karl Marx, or against
its prophets, Lenin and Stalin, then the results are not com-
patible with freedom of conscience.
Freedom of speech, press, and meetings: "These free-
doms," wrote Vyshinsky, "are the property of all the citizens
in the USSR, fully guaranteed by the State."
Now, Mr. Vyshinsky himself made appropriate comment
on this particular passage, and this time I quote him directly:
"In our state, naturally, there is and can be no place for
freedom of speech, press, and so on, for the foes of socialism.
Every attempt on their part to utilize to the detriment of
the State- that is to say, to the detriment of all the toilers
-these freedoms granted to the toilers must be classified as
a counter-revolutionary crime."
So you have freedom of speech so long as you don't
actually use it.
The inviolability of the person: "This means the legally
established guarantee of the citizen against unlawful arrest,
and against searches, seizures, and inspection of personal
correspondence, and other measures illegally limiting the
citizen's personal freedom."
This one always speaks for itself, because it is a reductio
ad absurdum. Does that sound sufficiently legal, Admiral,
for you?
Well, to come rapidly to the present, some people have
supposed that the Soviet Union is rapidly liberalizing itself
because there is, at the moment, a fair amount of dissent,
and this dissent is being talked about and is known in the
West. Many underground publications are being smuggled
out, and the self-publishing newspapers, known as samizdat,
are circulating in the Soviet Union. They are not being sup-
pressed, although quite obviously they could be very rapidly
suppressed if the KGB were so minded.
Well, it's true, of course, that things are not as bad as
they were in Stalin's day. It would be absurd to pretend
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that they are. But State terror takes different forms. The
forms that are now practiced in the Soviet Union are rela-
tively mild, in the sense that there are fewer people being
physically liquidated than there used to be. But the atmos-
phere of terror is, I understand, still very much present.
I'm reading an interesting book, which I commend to you,
"Message from Moscow," which unfortunately is anonymous
but appears to be very authentic. And it's undoubtedly true
that it is very difficult to hold dissenting opinions in the
Soviet Union and to express them, and that one faces all
kinds of penalties, which are usually the result of arbitrary
administrative action. A man may be deprived, for instance,
of his job, or maybe exiled, within the Soviet Union, to some
distant village, and, in many cases, actually sent to labor
corrective camps, or-and this is a refinement of recent
years- sent to a mental home, which has been the fate of
many dissidents in the last ten years.
There are two categories of dissidents in the Soviet
Union, and they are not, in my opinion, of equal importance.
The ones that have commanded most publicity in the West
are, of course, the literary dissidents, people like Solzhenitsyn,
or Amalrik, or Ginsburg, or Daniel or Sinyavsky, people who
either have been sent to labor corrective camps or have been
threatened with that kind of thing or expelled from the
writers' union, which, in effect, means that they can no longer
have their works published.
They are, of course, important, but not in the sense that
they constitute a challenge to the regime. Of course, the
regime doesn't like what is written about these people and
what is written about their cases in the West. I think, to
some extent, they are sensitive on this score. But they can
always keep news of the comments of the West out of their
newspapers, out of their media, since there is total control
over all forms of information and publicity. But these men
- the Solzhenitsyns of this world - do not constitute a direct
challenge to the power of the regime, which is exerted
through the Party, through the "naked sword of the revolu-
tion", as Vyshinsky termed it -that is, the secret police -
or the armed forces, which are themselves deeply penetrated
by the KGB through its Fourth Directorate, in effect, the
KGB within the armed forces, to make sure that they do not
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deviate too much politically and come to threaten the regime
from within.
The second category of dissidents I believe to be more
important, potentially, because dissent has now spread to
the scientific and technological community. And this is
fundamentally more important to the regime, for it can do
without writers, in the last resort, but it cannot do without
scientists, nuclear physicists, and people like that, on whom
the progress of the regime, in terms of its attempt to main-
tain military technological parity with this country, or to
surpass this country, in the last resort, depends.
There has been dissent in the scientific community for a
number of years, through people like the famous physicist,
Kapitza, and Lev Landau, another famous scientist whose
work was abridged through a terrible motor accident. But
recently there's been a change in the character of dissent, in
this sense, that whereas criticism of the regime until the
last few years consisted mainly of criticism within the
ideological framework, now criticism is going outside that
framework. And this is, in itself, a worrying factor for the
rulers of the Soviet Union.
At one stage, in effect, this was true in Trotsky's day,
true of the Trotskyist opposition in the 1930's and 1940's,
and was true until quite recently. In those days, people, in
effect, said, "Well, this is not what Marx really meant," or
"This is not what Lenin really meant, and we have created a
kind of bureaucratic dictatorship, a kind of opposite of
meritocracy and mediocracy, and this is not what socialism
meant, this is not what communism was intended to bring."
And this, to some extent, was, even from a strict regime
point of view, philosophically, at any rate, acceptable, al-
though it didn't prevent, of course, the terrible retribution
that was always taken against such people.
Now, however, the new phemonenon has come about.
People are actually questioning the basic tenets of Marxism.
They are arguing that socialism is not likely to work, at
least not socialism as Marxist and Leninist thought con-
strued it. They noticed that the standard of living, although
it's improved in the Soviet Union, has not improved as fast
as it has in some other countries which never had the benefit
of Marxism behind them- this country, for instance, or
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Sweden, or countries like that, which, in many respects, are
in advance of the Soviet Union, even in the provision of
welfare services. This is particularly true of Scandinavia
and, to some extent, of Great Britain.
And so the basic tenets of the State philosophy are being
questioned, and this, in itself, is a worrying thing.
Recently there have been a number of interesting cases,
such as that of the biologist, Medvedev, who was briefly
sent to a mental home. But there are a number of interesting
things about his case, one of which was that his fellow
scientists passed resolutions and put pressure on the Party,
and Medvedev very shortly after was released. This in itself
is something new, the Party yielding to pressure of this
kind. And, of course, there have been others. There has
been Sakharov, whose case is extremely important. He wrote
a very influential pamphlet that was smuggled out of the
Soviet Union some years ago, on coexistence, in which, again,
he wrote entirely outside Marxism. In effect, he argued that
the problems of the Soviet Union were the same in kind as
those of other countries, including the United States, and
that these problems were common to humanity -they had to
be faced together- and that the doctrine of permanent
hostility, which animates the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union, was, in effect, obsolete.
These people are people who are needed by the Soviet
Union. I stress that. And if dissent spreads in that com-
munity, it is bound to have far-reaching consequences. I
myself am not optimistic in the short or medium term. I
think the apparatus of repression is so strong that it is
unlikely that we shall get a change in the immediate future.
The only possibility of a change I foresee is in certain cir-
cumstances in which the hold over power, the monopoly of
power of the ruling Party, may come to be challenged be-
cause the system is no longer delivering the goods.
There were signs of this some years ago, when Profes-
sor Lieberman started using dirty words, such as "profit,"
"consumer interest," and things of that kind. At that time
the Soviet economy was marked by a tremendous stockpiling
of shoddy and unnecessary goods, which people were not
buying, and so some attention had to be paid to the profit
motive within individual factories, and also to the needs of
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the consumer, at the receiving end of a system which had
tremendous successes in the production of such basic heavy
industry products as steel. But, as somebody noticed, you
can do a lot of things with steel, but you can't wear it, and
you can't eat it.
And so this was the beginning of a challenge from within,
in the sense that people in high places in the Soviet Union
began to question whether the system itself was going to
deliver the goods. The crucial point, it seems to me, is not so
much whether the Soviet Union is being economically out
stripped, because if the newest prediction or forecast, pre-
sented at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress has any mean-
ing, then certainly the challenge from the Soviet Union is
not a thing to be ignored, even in economic terms. But the
really important thing is whether there is going to be a
growing gap in military technology. For some years, at the
time of the Cuba crisis in 1962, and from that point onwards,
there was, indeed, a gap in military technology between the
Soviet Union and the United States. That gap appears to
have been closed. And so I don't think the regime is threat-
ened at all in the immediate future. But if at any future
stage the gap were to reappear, and the armed forces, in
particular, could argue that the monopoly of power of the
ruling Party was no longer justified because the system was
enabling the United States and its allies to outdistance the
Soviet Union, in terms of defense, then, at such a stage, the
internal security of the regime would, I believe, be threatened.
But we are not yet in sight of that.
Now, that is, briefly, as I see it, the nature of the regime
and the nature of its internal problems.
To turn to the nature of its challenge. To some extent it
is inherent in the things that I've been describing, but it is
important to realize that the Soviet Union is now in a phase
of full forward-looking expansion in the foreign policy
domain; and that this represents a change of emphasis.
Under Khrushchev there was, indeed, a forward-looking
policy, but only until the Caribbean crisis of October, 1962.
Thereafter Khruschev, to some extent, soft-pedaled the whole
business of the forward policy. There are a number of in-
stances of that.
For example, in Laos, the Russians had got themselves
rather deeply involved because they had responded to an
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appeal for military aircraft, from the neutralist Prime Min-
ister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, at a time when the neutral-
ists, under Captain Kong Lae, were in alliance with the
communist forces of the Pathet Lao - which, of course, are
directly controlled by North Vietnam. But after the debacle
of 1962, Khruschev showed every sign of wishing to pull out
of Laos. Now, there was a contributory factor there which
should be mentioned very briefly, and that is that the planes
which had been sent to help the neutralists and their com-
munist friends were being used to bomb the communist
forces, because the neutralists had split with them; and
Khrushchev took a dim view of this. And Mr. R. A. Butler -
now Lord Butler - who at that stage was, very briefly,
Britain's Foreign Secretary, visited Moscow and talked over
Indochina with Khrushchev, because the British and the
Russians are Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences on
Indochina - the one of 1954, which brought the Indochina
War to an end, and the one of 1961-62, which was supposed to
have settled the fate of Laos; and Khrushchev said to him, in
effect, "If you want to go and hang yourselves on that meat
hook, go ahead, but we're getting out."
Now, this is just an indication, among others; and we
do know that Khrushchev and Mao, who were already not on
very good terms, really fell out at this period, because the
Chinese reckoned that the Russians were letting them down.
However, Khrushchev was overthrown in October, 1964, two
years later. And from that moment, there's been a resump-
tion of the expansive and aggressive foreign policy of the
Soviet Union. For instance, Khrushchev had kept the Soviet
Union out of the Indochina War; and it was not until Novem-
ber, 1964, a month after the overthrow of Khrushchev, that
the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam - in
other words, the political organization that controls the
Viet Cong -were allowed to open an office in Moscow. They
already had offices in Havana, in Algiers, in Jakarta, in East
Germany, and so on. In February, 1965, Mr. Kosygin, the
Soviet Premier, went to Hanoi with a very powerful delega-
tion, including people from the defense establishment. And
while they were there, the Viet Cong attacked American in-
stallations in South Vietnam, and the great escalation began.
But the Russians were - and this is the important part -
already committed to providing massive support in modern
Vol. 24
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armaments for North Vietnam, and that support has gone
on ever since. This was after the overthrow of Khrushchev.
About the same time as Khrushchev was overthrown,
there was a change in regime in the Sudan; and the Russians
were given staging rights for planes sent from Egypt, pro-
vided by the Soviet Union, to provide arms for the insurgents
fighting in the Congo. This, again, was an example of the
forward policy.
There has been the tremendous build-up in Egypt, which,
of course, was not initiated by Khrushchev's successors, but
has been greatly escalated since Khrushchev was overthrown.
There has been the build-up in the Mediterranean, and now
we have the new and very significant build-up in the Indian
Ocean. At the same time, there is an extremely active Soviet
policy in Africa and in Latin America.
In Africa, for instance, insurgents from certain areas-
that is, from the Portuguese territories, particularly Angola
and Mozambique, from Rhodesia, and from South Africa -
that is, all regimes that can be labeled by such choice epithets
as neo-colonialist, imperialist, or feudalist - are being trained
by the hundreds in Moscow and on the borders of the Crimean
and the Black Sea region.
At the same time, they are involved in a forward-looking
policy in Latin America, which is an extremely complex one,
which I can't analyze in any detail at the moment. But I'll
just give you an example. The highly-disciplined Communist
Party of Chile has achieved a share of power in the govern-
ment of Allende. This is, undoubtedly, the result of one of
Moscow's policies, which is in line with the policy of the
Italian Communist Party- the winning of a share of power
and the creation of the local Communist Party as a respect-
able party of order, which is an alternative government. You
saw that - to digress very briefly - in May and June, 1968,
in Paris, when rioters almost overthrew the government of
General de Gaulle, and the Communist Party, contrary to a lot
of popular misconceptions, emerged as the part of order, by
means of a general strike, and saved the regime, by not going
into an alliance with the students.
And you've got the same kind of phenomenon in Latin
America. Following the example of the Allende coalition, in
which the communists, as I say, have a share of power, the
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Communist Parties in Venezuela, in Brazil, and in Uruguay
are denouncing the terrorist excesses of the Tupamaros of
Uruguay, and other urban terrorists, and proposing the form-
ation of popular fronts. At the same time, there are grounds
for believing that the Russians are, at the same time, en-
couraging the terriorists, possibly providing them with money,
and certainly providing them, in some cases, with training
facilities, and, of course, throughout this period, providing fi-
nancial and economic support to the regime of Fidel Castro in
Cuba, which offers extensive training facilities for terrorists
from Latin America and also from Africa.
So, on the one hand, the Russians are encouraging local
Communist Parties to present themselves as alternative gov-
ernments, respectable, and worthy of being helped; and, on the
other hand, they are encouraging terrorism, because terrorism
undermines the regimes. If the regimes fall, the communists
then gain their chance of getting to power. And so the para-
dox is only apparent.
Admiral, I think I've probably used up my allocated time,
and I will, therefore, sit down; but if there are any questions,
I shall only be too pleased to answer them. Thank you.
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